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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Lawrence Scott Andrus appeals from the

district court’s

order denying his petition for

post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.

Statement

Of The

Facts

On March
Perrine Bridge to

Immediately

15,

And Course Of The Proceedings

2014, Andrus called several people and told them that he was heading to

commit

(Trial Tr., p.237, L.21

suicide.

commit

suicide.

walking 0n the bridge and made contact.
alcohol,

had slurred and slow speech, and

p.154, L.23; p.156, L.7

— p.157,

p.199, L.16; p.328, Ls.24-25.)

(Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.6-25.)

Andrus smelled of

his eyes

how much

Andrus

were red and watery.

He

treatment he needed.

(Trial Tr., p.198, L.2

had

—

t0

1

The

Which Andrus

trial transcript

failed.

was introduced

(m Trial

(E Trial

At

Tr.,

Tr.,

speak with

the hospital,

p.198, L.12

suicidal, but

—

was hungry,

p.197, Ls.22-24; p.329,

p.199, L.16; p.329, Ls.1 1-13.)

into custody

Concerned

that

Thereafter,

as an exhibit at the post—conviction evidentiary hearing

appears 0n pages 115 t0 276 in the Exhibits electronic document.

he

and conducted standard ﬁeld

(Trial Tr., p.206, Ls.19-20; p.224, Ls.20-22.)

refer t0 the internal pagination of the transcript.

—

be drunk and taken in so he could get the

had been drinking and driving, ofﬁcers took Andrus
sobriety tests,

t0 the hospital to

was not

stale

(Trial Tr., p.153, L.25

p.179, Ls.3-4.)

alcohol he drank.

also stated that he

told medical staff that he

Andrus

— p.156, L6;

hadn’t eaten in three days, and needed a hip replacement.
Ls.11-13.)

Andrus was

Ofﬁcers spotted Andrus

L.17.) Ofﬁcers transported

stories regarding

to report that

1.1)

(Trial Tr., p.240, Ls.1-7.)

a mental health professional. (Trial Tr., p.155, L.18

Andrus told various

p.238, L.1; p.543, Ls.4-1

Bishop Matthew Kear called 911

after their conversation,

driving to the bridge to

—

and

Citations to “Trial Tr.” Will

roughly ninety minutes after ofﬁcers
breath samples showing his

The

state

(m R., p.173.)
to a felony

BAC to be

contact With Andrus

247/248.

(Trial Tr., p.261, Ls.16-23; p.299, Ls.16-17.)

After extending and quickly revoking a plea offer, the state

DUI.

(E R., p.173.)
The

The matter proceeded

district court

t0 a jury trial

district court denied.

(R., p.169.)

Thereafter,

Andrus ﬁled a

the charge

and Andrus was found

for reconsideration of his sentence,

Andrus appealed; the Idaho Court of Appeals

afﬁrmed Andrus’s judgment 0f conviction and sentence.

WL 207130, N0. 42878 (Ct. App. Jan.

amended

sentenced Andrus t0 ten years With two years ﬁxed. (R.,

Andrus ﬁled an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion

which the

on the bridge, Andrus provided

charged Andrus With misdemeanor excessive driving under the inﬂuence (DUI).

guilty? (R., p.169.)

p.169.)

made

(R.,

p.169 (citing State

V.

Andrus, 2016

14, 2016)).)

petition for post-conviction relief.

court gave notice 0f its intent to dismiss the petition. (R., p.169.) After

The

(R., p.169.)

no amended

district

petition

ﬁled, the district court dismissed With prejudice the petition for post-conviction relief.

p.169.)

(citing

Andrus appealed; the Court of Appeals afﬁrmed the
V. State,

While

his post-conviction appeal

judgment pursuant
denied the motion.

to Idaho

(R.,

2

p.170 (citing Andrus

ﬂ alﬂ

p.169

(R., p.170.)

for relief

The

from

district court

Andrus appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed the

district

Rule 60(b) motion and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

V. State,

This was Andrus’s second

p.172, n.2.;

was pending, Andrus ﬁled a motion

Rule 0f Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).

(R., p.170.)

court’s denial 0f Andrus’s

(R.,

(R.,

WL 523589, No. 44686 (Ct. App., Jan. 24, 2018)).)

Andrus

2018

district court’s dismissal.

was

164 Idaho 565, 570, 433 P.3d 665, 670

trial in this case.

9/26/2019

The

Tr., p.10, Ls.6-16.)

(Ct.

ﬁrst trial resulted in a

App. 2019)).)

hung

jury.

(E R.,

On
motion

to

remand, Andrus ﬁled an amended Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment and a

amend

his petition for post—conviction relief.

granted both motions. (R., p.170.) Andrus’s
ineffective assistance 0f trial counsel based

offer before

it

was withdrawn;

testimony regarding the
closing.3

Widmark

(R., pp.61-70.)

court denied Andrus’s

(2) ﬁle

Andrus

amended

That claim

district court

petition for post-conviction relief alleged

0n counsel’s

failure t0: (1)

convey the

state’s plea

motions to exclude the breath

test results

and expert

After an evidentiary hearing and brieﬁng by the parties, the district
petition for post—conviction relief.

is

(R.,

pp.107-67, 169-185.)

(R., pp.189-90.)

was ineffective
not renewed on appeal.

also claimed trial counsel

(R., pp.67-68.)

The

Equation; and (3) obj ect t0 the prosecutor’s remarks in rebuttal

Andrus ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal.

3

amended

(R., pp.10-30, 170.)

for failing t0

move

t0 disqualify the judge.

IS SUE

Andrus

Did

states the issue

on appeal

as:

the district court err in denying Mr. Andrus’s petition for post-conviction relief

because he established that he received ineffective assistance 0f counsel by a preponderance 0f
the evidence?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Andrus

failed t0

show

that the district court erred

post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing?

when

it

denied his petition for

ARGUMENT
Andrus Has Failed To Show That The

District Court Erred

Post-Conviction Relief Following

A.

When It Denied His

Petition For

An Evidentiarv Hearing

Introduction

Andrus argues
relief in

that the district court erred

which he asserted

When

it

denied his petition for post-conviction

that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in several ways.

The

district court

properly concluded that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing failed t0

establish that

Andrus was

entitled t0 post-conviction relief.

Andrus argues

First,

the prosecutor

made

that trial counsel

in rebuttal closing.

was

ineffective for failing to object t0

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-1

comments

However, counsel was not

1.)

deﬁcient for not objecting, given that the comments did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct

because they were based 0n the evidence presented
Additionally,

has

at trial, primarily

Andrus was not prejudiced by the alleged deﬁciency of

now shown

that

Andrus’s

own

testimony.

failing to object.

Andrus

an objection 0r motion for mistrial based 0n the comments would have been

granted and counsel testiﬁed that he did not believe the comments would have swayed the jury.

Second, Andrus argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to convey the state’s

misdemeanor plea

offer before

it

was revoked. (Appellant’s

brief, pp.1 1-14.)

Counsel did not

provide deﬁcient performance by not conveying the offer within forty—eight hours of receiving

it,

given his schedule and the fact that the offer was not set t0 expire for a week. Further, Andrus

was not prejudiced by
have accepted the plea
Last,

test results

the alleged deﬁciency because the evidence demonstrates he

would not

offer.

Andrus argues

that counsel

was

ineffective for failing t0

and testimony regarding the Widmark Equation.

move

t0 exclude the breath

(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-19.)

However, both the

test results

and the expert testimony were admissible and any motion

exclude the evidence would have been unsuccessful.

were excludable because of one

line

Andrus

of ofﬁcer testimony

asserts that the breath test results

at trial, in

Which the ofﬁcer asserted

he did not have eyes 0n Andrus for the entire ﬁfteen minute waiting period. (Appellant’s
pp.15-16 (citing Trial

Tr.,

and Video evidence demonstrated

were

in the

that factual

However, the

p.264, Ls.10-12).)

that

room with him during

district court

the entire ﬁfteen—minute period.

asserts that the

found that testimony

the

time he was driving.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-19.)

Widmark Equation was used

Widmark Equation testimony was

results,

the state used the information that

expected

for post-conviction relief has the

the evidence, the allegations

0n Which

burden of proof

P.2d 964, 965
fact

to calculate

his

(Ct.

is

A

district court’s

entitled to great weight.

App. 1990). Where the

I.C.R. 57(0); Estes V. State, 111

Sanders

district court

decision that a petitioner has not

V. State,

117 Idaho 939, 940, 792

conducts a hearing and enters ﬁndings of

and conclusions of law, an appellate court Will disturb the ﬁndings of

clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of

State,

what

burden of proving, by a preponderance of

his claims are based.

Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986).
his

Andrus himself provided

test

Of Review

A petitioner

met

However, Andrus mistakes the way

BAC would have been and rebut Andrus’s versions 0f events.

Standard

B.

too

BAC

Rather than work backwards from the breath

at trial.

that

Andrus does not challenge

speculative t0 be scientiﬁcally reliable for retrograde extrapolation t0 determine Andrus’s

at the

that

brief,

Andrus was under the surveillance 0f several ofﬁcers

ﬁnding on appeal. Andrus also

to

fact only if they are

law drawn therefrom.

Mitchell V.

132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-30 (1998). The credibility 0f witnesses, weight

to

be given

to their testimony,

and inferences

within the province of the district court.

(Ct.

be drawn from the evidence are

to

Peterson

V. State,

all

matters solely

139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110

App. 2003).

The

C.

District

Court Did Not Err

When

Denied Andrus’s Petition For Post-Conviction

It

Relief

T0 succeed on

a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance 0f counsel, a petitioner

must demonstrate both deﬁcient performance and

466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984);

facie case for ineffective assistance

898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994).

An

0f counsel.

Roman

attorney’s performance

V. State,

is

is

facts,

774 P.2d 299, 307

do not make out a prima

125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d

not constitutionally deﬁcient unless

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and

counsel’s conduct

Strickland V. Washington,

State V. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137,

Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by speciﬁc

(1989).

falls

resulting prejudice.

there

is

it

a strong presumption that

Within the Wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

Gibson

V.

m, 110 Idaho

631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis V. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775

P.2d 1243, 1248

(Ct.

App. 1989). T0 establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s deﬁcient performance, the

have been

m,

Aragon

different.

114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988);

132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 245

1.

at trial

showed

that

(E Trial

Tr.,

p.237, L.21

—

Mg

App. 1999).

Ineffective For

Not Obiecting T0

Andrus contacted several people and indicated

feeling suicidal, including Kear, Nebeker,

Moeller.

(Ct.

Andrus Has Failed T0 Show That Counsel Was
The Prosecutor’s Remarks In Rebuttal Closing

The evidence

was

V. State,

outcome of the proceeding would

Cahoon and

that

his son, Williams, Swearingen,

p.238, L.1; p.505, Ls.3-21; p.509, Ls.1-7; p.51

1,

he

and

Ls.5-12;

p.539, L.14

jump
t0

— p.540,

L.4; p.543, Ls.4-1

Because he told Kear

1.)

that

he was suicidal and going t0

off the bridge, Kear reported that information to law enforcement, ofﬁcers were dispatched

respond t0 a suicidal subject, and ofﬁcers took Andrus t0 the hospital to speak with a mental

(E Trial

health professional.

However,
overheard Andrus

at the hospital,

a staff

tell

days and wanted food.

p.240, Ls.1-7; p.155, L.18

Tr.,

Andrus began

member

(Trial

that

— p.156,

L.6; p.179, Ls.3-4.)

he wasn’t actually suicidal but hadn’t eaten in three

TL, p.197, Ls.22-24.) Andrus also told the worker that he drank

half a pint 0f vodka that day and “you have to be [drunk] to take care of

down and grabbed

his hip.”

Deputy Koopmans

t0 tell a different story.

—

(Trial T11, p.198, L.2

p.199, L.16.)

reﬂected that he had issues With his hip and sought treatment.

and he reached

this,

Andrus’s medical record

(E Trial

Tr.,

p.324, L.25

—

p.325, L.21.) Andrus “report[ed] that he has been drinking and acting suicidal because he needs

his left hip replaced,

At

the

jail,

and

this is the

When Andrus

(E Trial

Tr.,

that happen.”

(Trial T11, p.329, Ls.1 1-13.)

p.548, Ls.5-10.)

took the stand on his

and called several people

in the

own

However, he also testiﬁed

that

he lied t0 these people.

and he wouldn’t

(Trial Tr., p.516, Ls.12-16; p.537, L.6

different stories t0

wanted food,

that

behalf, he testiﬁed that he drove around

hopes that someone would invite him over.

“intentionally” got people “concerned”

location.

way to make

an ofﬁcer asked Andrus, “so drinking and driving was the answer” and Andrus

appeared to smile and nod.

12-22.)

only

—

tell

them

p.540, L.7.)

agreed that these people were

medical treatment for his hip.

all

T11,

(Trial Tr., p.502, Ls.

Andrus testiﬁed

that

Andrus admitted

p.519, L.23

he told

that

suicidal, that

— p.520,

L.24.)

he just

Andrus

taking his suicide threats seriously, but What he wanted

(Trial Tr., p.543, L.4

he

his location or lied about his

law enforcement and medical staff—told them he was not
he wanted t0 get his hip ﬁxed. (Trial

town

— p.544, L20.) Andrus

was

testiﬁed that he

manipulated the circumstances to get taken t0 the hospital and get treatment for his hip.

Tr.,

— p.524,

p.523, L.10

Andrus

L.5.)

reporter: that during his career,

won

an

“profession

was

as a television

Emmy.

sitting

United States president, traveled the

Trial Tr., p.500, Ls.20-24.)

news

news

also testiﬁed to his prior success as a television

he interviewed a

(m

world, and

(Trial

Andrus testiﬁed

reporter,” his “speech typically

is

that,

pretty good.”

given his

(Trial Tr.,

p.521, Ls.15-17.)

During closing argument, the prosecutor pointed out the inconsistent
told.

(E Trial

Tr.,

p.570, L.13

— p.572,

closing that Andrus told different stories.

prosecutor

made

stories that

Andrus

Andrus’s counsel acknowledged in his

L.24.)

(Trial Tr., p.580, Ls.1 1-17.)

own

In rebuttal closing, the

the following statement to the jury:

Let’s g0 over those stories.

The defendant

whereabouts.

He

Nebeker about

his suicidal, ideations,

lied t0

Bishop Kear about his

Cahoon, Williams, and
and he’s saying that he was depressed that
day, but you also heard what happened at the hospital. I’m not suicidal anymore.
I just want help with my hip. He manipulated those people. He manipulated the
lied to Kear, Swearingen, Moeller,

now he’s trying t0
He knows how
t0 speak. He knows how t0 present, and he’s so good he’s won an Emmy. He
also told you that what he really wanted that day was human contact, a friend. He
wouldn’t tell his friends where he was. He was manipulating them; now he’s
sheriff’ s deputies

and the dispatchers and the medical

manipulate you. He’s good

at

it.

One of the

staff,

and

best I’ve ever seen.

trying to manipulate you. Don’t be manipulated.

(Trial Tr., p.590, L.15

In his

— p.591,

amended

Counsel did not object

to this statement.

petition for post-conviction relief,

Andrus claimed

L.5.4)

ineffective for failing to object to the

4

comment and move

Earlier in her closing, the prosecutor stated that

for a mistrial.

Andrus “hasn’t

convenient for him.” (Trial

and his story changed whenever it is
Andrus references this comment in his argument,
claim that this

comment

Andrus conceded:

“it is

(R., pp.64-65.)

was

When

told the truth to anyone, anyone,
Tr.,

p.576, Ls.19-20.) Although

Appellant’s brief, p.7), he has waived any

constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

brief before the district court,
that as

(ﬂ

that counsel

In his post-evidentiary hearing

unlikely that any court

an egregious misstatement warranting a mistrial.”

(R., p.1 17.)

would

characterize

comment

presented With the transcript of the prosecutor’s

initially stated

he believed

him. (9/26/2019

it

was

T11, p.49,

it

at the

evidentiary hearing, counsel

constituted prosecutorial misconduct and

—

L.11

p.51, L.17.)

must have “slipped past”

However, he also testiﬁed

that

he did not believe

prosecutorial misconduct to point out that a defendant’s story changed.

He

p.57, Ls.1-10.)

have granted a
(9/26/2019

comments.

to the prosecutor’s

(R., pp.176-79.)

found that the prosecutor’s comments were not improper and did not
prosecutorial misconduct.

(R.,

manipulate the hospital

The Defendant testiﬁed

that

he

won an Emmy.”

(R., p.178.)

to

to

lying to

inﬂame

Thus, the

district court

The

district court

would have granted a
district court

mistrial

concluded

that,

then found that

it

own

the jury, but rather

testimony.”

if

(R.,

t0

Further,

were “pointing out

was supported

pp.178-79 (emphasis

would be “very unlikely”

based on the prosecutor’s comments.

even

Kear,

found that

(R., p.178.)

a pattern 0f manipulative conduct and behavior on the part 0f the Petitioner that

in the record, including the Petitioner’s

of

into getting medical attention.

the prosecutor’s remarks “were simply restatements of uncontested fact.”

comments were not an attempt

district court

The Defendant admitted attempting

and the circumstances generally,

staff,

The

rise to the level

“The Defendant admitted

pp.176-78.)

Swearingen, Moeller, Cahoon, Williams, and Nebeker.

in original).)

would

concluded that Andrus failed to show that counsel provided ineffective

by not objecting

by evidence

court

L.17 — p.58, L.14.)

district court

the prosecutor’s

trial

nor did he think that the comments would have swayed the jury.

mistrial,

Tr., p.57,

The
assistance

testiﬁed that even if he had objected, he did not believe the

(9/26/2019 TL,

that the trial court

(R., p.179.)

Therefore, the

counsel were deﬁcient by failing t0 object, Andrus was not

prejudiced by that failure. (R., p.179.)

10

The

district court

properly determined that Andrus was not entitled t0 relief based 0n

counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s comments.

“‘[A]bsent egregious misstatements,

the failure to object during closing argument and opening statement

permissible professional legal conduct.”

(Ct.

App. 2017) (quoting Cunningham

prosecutor’s

comments were

neither

V.

Grove

V. State,

is

within the Wide range of

161 Idaho 840, 863, 392 P.3d 18, 41

Wong, 704 F.3d

1143, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013)).

The

“egregious misstatements,” nor did they amount t0

Thus, counsel was not deﬁcient for not objecting, nor was Andrus

prosecutorial misconduct.

prejudiced.

“There

fully,

from

from
it.”

is

considerable latitude in closing argument, and both sides are entitled to discuss

their respective standpoints, the evidence

State V. Alwin, 164 Idaho 160, 169,

ellipsis omitted).

on any
trial,

law as

set forth

including reasonable inferences that

that should

be drawn

426 P.3d 1260, 1269 (2018) (quotation marks and

“[P]r0secutorial misconduct occurs

factor other than the

and the inferences

by

When

the State attempts t0 secure a verdict

the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at

may be drawn from

that evidence.”

State V. Miller,

165 Idaho 115, 122, 443 P.3d 129, 136 (2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[I]n reviewing allegations

realities

0f trial.”’

m,

of prosecutorial misconduct,

164 Idaho

at 169,

559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)).

426 P.3d

at

this

Court ‘must keep in mind the

1269 (quoting State

V. Field,

Closing arguments “are seldom carefully constructed in

toto before the event; improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect

than crystal clear.”

Donnellv

V.

144 Idaho

and meaning

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).

less

Thus, “a court

most damaging

should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have

its

meaning 0r

meaning from the

that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will

plethora of less damaging interpretations.” Li.

11

draw

that

Idaho courts have consistently held that

“[i]t is

not misconduct.

.

.to refer to

as a liar if the defendant admitted to lying in connection with the case.”

Idaho 15, 18-19, 189 P.3d 477, 480-81 (Ct. App. 2008). Nor
state or insinuate that the

is it

defendant lied Where that statement

from the evidence presented

E

at trial.

is

the defendant

State V. Gross, 146

misconduct for a prosecutor

t0

a reasonable inference drawn

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 274-76,

429 P.3d 149,

162-64 (2018) (prosecutor’s twenty comments in closing “either explicitly saying 0r insinuating
that Herrera

evidence

had

at trial

lied in various

ways

to various

and “did not cross the

m

people” were reasonable inferences based 0n the

line into the

realm 0f misconduct”);

ﬂ alﬂ

Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 501, 399 P.3d 804, 828 (2017) (“Because the prosecutor supported his
assertions [that Lankford

was a

liar]

With evidence presented during the

although troubling, did not constitute misconduct”).

defendant a

name

comment may be

“brief and isolated” such that

trial

Even where a prosecutor has

district court

it

is

(Ct.

E

testimony.

Williams, and Nebeker.

testiﬁed that

it

was

his hip, that this

Ls.2-4.)

Tr.,

properly found that the prosecutor’s comments were not improper

Andrus testiﬁed

(E Trial

Tr.,

that

was thought out

p.540, Ls.5-7, 20-22; p.543, L. 4

for a manipulative purpose.

Even Andrus’s counsel pointed out
Andrus testiﬁed

in closing that

that

at

trial—primarily

he lied t0 Kear, Swearingen, Moeller, Cahoon,

his intent t0 manipulate the circumstances so

p.580, Ls.11-17.)

State V. Johnson,

App. 2010).

because they were based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence

own

called the

not so egregious or inﬂammatory as to

or entitle the defendant t0 a mistrial.

149 Idaho 259, 266, 233 P.3d 190, 197

Andrus’s

the statements,

during closing, such as referring to the defendant as a “buzzard,” that single

deprive the defendant of a fair

The

trial,

—

p.544, L.16.)

He

he could get medical care for

(Trial Tr., p.523, Ls.10-19; p.526,

Andrus told

different stories.

(Trial

he was a skilled speaker and news reporter, he

12

interviewed a sitting United States president and

As

won an Emmy.

(E Trial TL, p.500, Ls.20-24.)

the state argued below, “the prosecutor never called [Andrus] a

lied.

She didn’t

The

district court

call

[Andrus] a manipulator, she pointed out

liar,

When he

she pointed out

when he

manipulated.” (R., p. 146.)

properly found that the prosecutor “was pointing out a pattern 0f manipulative

conduct and behavior on the part of the Petitioner that was supported by evidence in the record.”
(R.,

pp.178-179.)

Thus, the prosecutor’s remarks were based “the evidence admitted

including reasonable inferences that

prosecutorial misconduct.

Andrus argues
personal opinion.

E m,

that the

may be drawn from
165 Idaho

at 122,

that evidence”

443 P.3d

it

V.

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46,

fact that a prosecutor

a personal opinion does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

1197

(Ct.

App. 2018).

that, if the State

must be based 0n the evidence and

should not be couched in terms of a personal opinion.” State

285, 296, 411 P.3d 1186,

makes a statement

in terms

it

In Williams, although the prosecutor’s

did not rise t0 the level 0f prosecutorial misconduct.

statement that the defense’s theory
credible argument based

found

that,

was

of

State V. Williams, 163 Idaho

statement “that defense counsel’s opening and closing remarks were ludicrous allegations”

improper,

t0

the prosecutor added her

“This court has long instructed

expresses an opinion as t0 the credibility of a witness,

408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017). However, the mere

and did not amount

at 136.

comments were improper because

(Appellant’s brief, pp.8—9.)

at trial,

Li.

“[T]he prosecutor’s

ludicrous, though improper, highlighted that

on the evidence presented during

trial.” Li.

was

it

was not a

The Idaho Court of Appeals

“[W]hile the prosecutor should have refrained from stating his personal beliefs and

opinions regarding Williams’ defense,” those statements were based on inferences drawn from

the evidence at

trial.

Li.

13

The prosecutor’s comment

that

Andrus was “[0]ne 0f the best

although couched as a personal opinion, was based on the evidence.

Andrus’s testimony that he
that

is

such a skilled speaker that he has

won

ever seen,”

[she’s]

The comment highlighted
an

Emmy for his

abilities,

he had several of his friends concerned for him, and that he manipulated his friends, law

enforcement, medical

staff,

neither improper nor did

it

and the situation generally

t0 get

medical treatment.

E

constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

Thus,

from a single woman” who would want

t0

there

was n0

if the prosecutor’s

am yet

have sex With multiple sports team members

one time—was not improper). Thus, counsel was not deﬁcient for

Even

was

State V. Troutman, 148

Idaho 904, 912, 231 P.3d 549, 557 (Ct. App. 2010) (prosecutor’s statement in closing—”I
to hear

it

comments were improper,

at

failing t0 object.

the district court properly found that

resulting prejudice for counsel’s failure t0 object.

The prosecutor’s statements

to

Which Andrus now objects made up only a small portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument.

(m

Trial

TL, p.564, L.1 — p.579, L.4; p.587, L.1 — p.591, L.6.)

evidentiary hearing, given the evidence, that statement

the jury.

(9/26/2019

T11, p.58, Ls.9-12.)

As

counsel testiﬁed at the

would not have had

the

power

t0 persuade

Further, the district court instructed the jury that the

arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence:

“Certain things you have heard 0r

seen are not evidence, including, one arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not
Witnesses.

What

they say in their opening statements, closing arguments, and at other times.

.

.is

not evidence.” (Trial TL, p.557, Ls.19-25.) “[T]his Court presumes the jury followed the court’s
jury instructions, even

instructions

from the

when

trial

the prosecutorial misconduct occurs after the jury receives

court.”

State V. Saenz, 167 Idaho 443,

2020) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
instructions can be sufﬁcient to

remedy improper

14

470 P.3d 1252, 1260

(Ct.

its

App.

This Court has recognized that such

statements.

E

Lankford, 162 Idaho at 501-

02,

399 P.3d

at

inﬂammatory
at 172,

how

828-29 (“[W]e do not think [the prosecutor’s comments] were so egregious 0r

that they

426 P.3d

at

would not have been cured by the

court’s instruction”); Alwin, 164 Idaho

1272 (concluding that prosecutor’s statements Which offered an opinion of

people behave under stress that was directly contrary to expert witness’s testimony and not

based on any facts in evidence constituted misconduct but were not so egregious that

it

was not

remedied by trial court’s instruction that counsel’s argument was not evidence).

Andrus

had counsel objected, the

asserts that,

trial

court should have sustained the

objection and either given a curative instruction 0r declared a mistrial.

7.)

Andrus then

asserts that, “[h]ad the trial court refused to

required t0 prove that the misconduct

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)

was harmless. (Appellant’s

He

do

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-

so, the state

would have been

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 0n appeal.”

then goes on to argue that the state cannot

brief, pp.9-1 1.) First, as

now

prove the error

discussed above, the district court instructed

the jury that the arguments 0f the lawyers, speciﬁcally including closing arguments, are not

evidence.

(Trial Tr., p.557, Ls.19-25.)

the issue before this Court.

This

is

Second, Andrus

is

not applying the correct standard to

not an appeal from an objected-to allegation 0f prosecutorial

misconduct; the state need not prove that the

trial

court’s hypothetical error in overruling

counsel’s hypothetical objection did not contribute t0 the outcome.

petitioner asserting ineffective assistance 0f counsel based

prevail below,

that

Andrus bears the burden of showing

0n the

Rather, as a post—conviction

failure t0 object,

that the district court erred

When

Who
it

did not

concluded

he did not meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deﬁcient

performance due t0

its

conclusion that the

had counsel made one.

E

trial

court

would not

likely

have sustained an obj ection

Sanders, 117 Idaho at 940, 792 P.2d at 965 (“A post-conviction

applicant has the burden of proving the grounds

15

upon which he seeks

relief”

and “the lower

court’s decision that the burden 0f proof has not

has failed t0 do

been met

is

entitled t0 great weight”).

so.

Andrus Has Failed T0 Show That Counsel Was
The Plea Offer Before It Was Revoked

2.

The

Andrus

state sent a plea offer t0

Ineffective For Failing

Andrus’s counsel on April 23, 2014.

To Convey

(EX., p.112.)

The

terms 0f the offer were that Andrus plead guilty t0 misdemeanor DUI, excessive, and failure t0

purchase a driver’s license; in exchange, the

state

would dismiss

order and providing false information charges and limit

its

the Violation 0f a

no contact

sentencing recommendation to 365

days with 335 suspended. (EX., p.1 12.) The state’s offer was expressly set t0 expire 0n April 29.

However, on April 25, just two days

(EX., p.1 12)

conveyed the offer

At

to Andrus, the state

after the offer

revoked the

was extended and before counsel

(E EX., pp.1 13-14.)

offer.

the evidentiary hearing, counsel testiﬁed that he probably

state’s offer

would have

on April 24. (9/26/2019 TL, p.18, Ls.12-14.) Because he was

in court “almost all

day every day,” he estimated April 26 would have been the

earliest

Andrus

Counsel “knew

to discuss the offer.

(9/26/2019

Tr., p.18, Ls.14-18.)

ﬁrst seen the

he could have met with

[he]

had a

bit

of

time to get the offer to Mr. Andrus” because 0f the April 29 expiration date and was “surprised

when

[they] got

such a quick withdrawal 0f [the offer].” (9/26/2019

Tr., p.19, Ls.1 1-14.)

Counsel testiﬁed that he would have advised Andrus to take the plea
criminal history.

(9/26/2019

he did not want t0 plead

Tr., p.19,

guilty.

“Andrus was not going

t0 give

trial.

Ann

an inch on this” so counsel met

(9/26/2019

Although counsel discussed potential resolutions With Andrus,
Tr., p.56, Ls.5-8.)

given his

L.22 — p.21, L.3.) However, Andrus had been clear that

With Andrus frequently t0 prepare for the inevitable

(9/26/2019

offer,

“it

Tr., p.14,

was always

Ls.17-22.)

‘try the

case.”

Bailey, counsel’s legal secretary, testiﬁed that the ﬁrst offer

16

she recalled seeing on Andrus’s case

p.68, L.15

—

(9/26/2019

Tr., p.71,

Ls.12-13.)

Nancy

“Withdrawn” written on

Counsel testiﬁed that he did not think the court would have

Andrus accepted the

offer in writing before

(E 9/26/2019

the charge to a felony.

pp.1-16,

EX.,

112.)

Withdrawn. (9/26/2019
at

the

Tr., p.23, Ls.3-8.)

(9/26/2019

it

T11,

on April 25.

(ﬂ 9/26/2019

T11, p.82,

L.3

—

p.84, L.17;

Austin was awaiting conﬁrmation 0f Andrus’s prior

convictions; once she received conﬁrmation, the

accepted

was Withdrawn and

L.7 — p.79, L.7.) Austin conveyed the offer alongside the state’s discovery

response, which included Andrus’s criminal history.

ﬂ alﬂ

it

Austin extended the plea offer on April 23 and withdrew

Tr., p.78,

(9/26/2019 TL,

it.

Austin, a prosecutor assigned t0 the case in 2014, also testiﬁed.

p.77, Ls.9-16.)

(9/26/2019

if

amended

state thereafter

in With

Bailey reiterated that Andrus “wasn’t interested” in taking an offer.

p.69, L6.)

accepted the plea deal

came

T11, p.85, L.1

— p.86,

DUI was amended t0

a felony and the offer

DUI
was

L.5.) Austin testiﬁed that plea offers “are typically

a pretrial conference,” and even if Andrus attempted to accept the offer in writing in

advance of the

pretrial conference,

he would not have been able to enter a plea

until

he was

before ajudge. (9/26/2019 Tr., p.79, Ls.14-20.)

The

district court

found that the

23 and withdrew the offer 0n April 25.

state sent its plea offer to

court 0n April 24 and 25; thus, the earliest he

discuss the offer

would have been on April

withdrawn.

(R., p.171.)

assistance

failing t0

by

The

First, the district court

lawyer’s duty

is ‘to

district court

convey the offer

The

(R., p.171.)

to

counsel at some point on April

district court

found that counsel was in

would have been able
26,

by Which time

t0

meet with Andrus

the offer

t0

had already been

concluded that counsel did not render ineffective

Andrus before

found Andrus failed

act with reasonable promptness.
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to

it

was Withdrawn.

show

3”

(R.,

that counsel acted deﬁciently.

“A

p.172 (emphasis in original, quoting

I.R.P.C. 13.3).)

is

“That [counsel] would convey and discuss the offer With [Andrus] on the 26th

reasonable given the circumstances.” (R., p.172.) This was not a case of “procrastination

nor 0f unreasonable promptness,” nor did counsel allow the offer to expire.
“Give[n] the paucity 0f time that passed between
withdrawal,” the

fall

district court

found that

trial

[trial

(R., p.172.)

counsel’s] receipt 0f the offer and

its

counsel’s failure to communicate the offer did not

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and was therefore not deﬁcient performance.

(R., pp.171-72.)

Second, the

district court

found that Andrus failed to show prejudice. The evidence did

not support the conclusion that Andrus would have accepted the offer if it was conveyed before

was Withdrawn;

evidence showed that Andrus was insistent on going to

rather, the

trial

and did

not want to take a plea deal. (R., pp.172-73.) Further, Andrus failed to demonstrate that the
court

would have accepted

it

trial

the plea in light of Andrus’s criminal history and the state’s ﬁling of a

superseding felony charge. (R., pp.173-74.)

The

district court

“The Sixth Amendment
process.”

properly determined that counsel did not render ineffective assistance.

right t0 effective assistance

Fortin V. State,

0f counsel extends to the plea bargaining

demonstrate prejudice based on counsel’s failure to convey a plea

show:

(1)

App. 2016).

T0

offer, the petitioner

must

160 Idaho 437, 445, 374 P.3d 600, 608

he would have accepted the plea and the

intervening circumstances; (2) the district court

state

(Ct.

would not have withdrawn

would have accepted

it

in light

of

the terms 0f the plea

agreement; and (3) the conviction 0r sentence under the plea agreement would have been more
favorable than the conviction or sentence ultimately imposed. Li. at 446, 374 P.3d at 609 (citing

Laﬂer

V.

Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012)).
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The United

States

communicate a formal plea

Supreme Court has held
offer

from the

state

that

Missouri

V.

expire.

The Court held

to expire without

In

m,

The Court noted

expiration date one

month

When he

American Bar Association and most

Here, unlike in ﬁle, counsel did not perform deﬁciently.

it

the state’s offers for over a

the offer to lapse.

t0

He

state

testiﬁed,

and the

district court

Counsel received the

(R., p.171; EX., pp.1 12-14.)

As

the

it

and well

in

clients

sat

on

found, that he could have met with Andrus

(9/26/2019

state

T11, p.18,

withdrew the offer

advance of the offer’s express expiration

Supreme Court and

an obligation to communicate plea offers to

state’s

Andrus’s counsel did not allow

However, he never got the chance because the

within forty—eight hours of extending

at

t0 expire,

at

at 145-46.

had an expiration date of April 29. Unlike Frye’s counsel who

month and allowed them

Li

it.”

bar associations require

Li

convey the offer on April 26, several days before the offer expired.

Ls.14-18; R., p.171.)

Li.

that counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance

that the

0n April 23 and saw

later.

offers t0

t0 Frye

defense counsel to promptly communicate plea offers with their clients.

offer

two

the state extended

“allowed the offer to expire without advising the defendant or allowing him t0 consider
145.

t0

fails

and instead allowed both

Defense counsel failed to convey the offers
Li.

ﬁxed

counsel

defense counsel has performed

it,

nge, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012).

alternative plea offers to defense counsel, both with a

at 138.

defense

and instead allows the offer

giving the defendant an opportunity to consider 0r accept

deﬁciently.

When

district court noted,

date.

defense counsel has

With reasonable promptness. 3L6, 566 U.S.

145-46; (R., p.172). That counsel did not communicate the state’s offer within the ﬁrst forty-

eight hours 0f the express seven-day acceptance

promptly communicate nor does

it

Window does

constitute deﬁcient performance.
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not demonstrate a failure t0

Although Andrus recognizes

that the timing

0f When counsel meets With a client in jail t0

convey a plea offer “depends on many circumstances, including counsel’s schedule and whether
the information

is

time-sensitive,”

Andrus nonetheless argues

unreasonably by failing t0 convey the offer before

However, the very
sensitivity

was

factors

trial

it

would not expire

for counsel t0 believe he could

day of the hearing, not

Andrus asks

until April 29.

convey the offer

allowed, just a few days after the offer

hearing and expiration date.

As Austin

Thus,

it

was made but

Andrus on April 26; the

was

Andrus 0n April

its

every effort be

this court t0

expiration.

made

Counsel

obj ectively reasonable

26—when

his schedule

several days in advance of the pretrial

testiﬁed, offers such as this are typically accepted

on the

in writing days in advance.

judge counsel’s performance by

(E Appellant’s brief,

for ineffective assistance 0f counsel.

its result,

p. 12.)

to eliminate the distorting effects

at the time.

P.3d 289, 305 (2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

would have done—conveyed
the expiration date, there

the offer

would be n0

arguing that the

state

revoked the

However, hindsight cannot be the basis

“‘[A] fair assessment 0f attorney performance requires that

be evaluated ‘from counsel’s perspective

is

to

to see

convey the offer by April 25 was deﬁcient performance because the

offer before

brief, pp.1 1-12.)

counsel acted reasonably in this case.

day 0n April 24 and 25 and would have been able

offer explicitly stated that

failure to

was revoked. (Appellant’s

it

Andrus has identiﬁed—counsel’s schedule and the time-

that

0f the information—support that

in court all

that counsel acted objectively

999

0f hindsight,’ and counsel’s conduct must

Dunlap

at 689).

on April 26—and the
basis for

Andrus

V. State,

159 Idaho 280, 296, 360

Had

counsel done as he testiﬁed he

state

not withdrawn

its

offer before

to claim that counsel acted deﬁciently.

only because 0f the state ’s action of quickly Withdrawing the offer before the expiration
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It

date—

Which counsel could not have foreseenS—that Andrus now
Andrus has

performance.

faults counsel for otherwise effective

failed to demonstrate that counsel’s

performance

fell

below an

obj ective standard of reasonableness.6

Even assuming counsel performed deﬁciently by not conveying
days of receiving

the district court properly concluded that

it,

Andrus

Although the terms of the plea offer were more favorable

prejudice.

the plea offer within

t0

two

failed to demonstrate

Andrus than

his ultimate

conviction and sentence, Andrus failed to present any evidence that he would have accepted the
state’s offer 0r that the district court

First, there is

no evidence

would have accepted

that

the plea agreement.

Andrus would have accepted the

evidence clearly indicates that Andrus wanted to proceed to
testiﬁed that

evidence

Andrus was not

at the

interested in an offer

and insisted

hearing that he would have accepted the offer if

the district court properly found that “there

have accepted the

5

trial.

was n0 reasonable

state’s offer.

Rather, the

Counsel and Bailey both

trial.

Andrus presented no

was presented

t0 him.

Thus,

probability that [Andrus]

would

it

offer.” (R., p.173.)

As Andrus pointed

out at the evidentiary hearing, the state conveyed the offer along With

discovery response, which indicated the state was aware of Andrus’s criminal history

made

the offer.

(m

9/26/2019

Tr., p.82,

L.3

—

p.84, L.17.)

when

its
it

Thus, there was n0 reason for

counsel t0 anticipate that the offer would be Withdrawn before the expiration date.
6

At times

in his

opening

brief,

Andrus characterizes

his claim as being that counsel

(m

was

was revoked.
was objectively reasonable t0 not review the state's offer
before it was revoked.”).) First, that was not the basis for which Andrus argued counsel was
ineffective below, (ﬂ R., pp.62-63) and therefore is not properly before this Court on appeal,
State V. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019).
Second, counsel’s
testimony at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates that he reviewed the offer before it was
Withdrawn.
9/26/2019 TL, p.18, Ls.9-18 (“I probably would have seen [the offer] 0n the
24th.”); p.19, Ls.1 1-14 (“I knew we had a little bit of time to get the offer t0 Mr. Andrus. So we
ineffective for failing to review the state’s offer before

p.15 (“[The question

is

Whether

it

it

ﬂ

(E

were surprised when we got such a quick withdrawal of it.”).)
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Appellant’s brief,

Second, Andrus has not shown that the
agreement.

Fo_rtin,

“[T]rial courts

160 Idaho

before the

at

have the freedom

(E

9/26/2019

t0 accept or reject

Tr., p.79,

Ls.14-20.)

court could have rejected the plea deal, and likely

Wished

(9/26/2019

history.

Tr.,

p.23, Ls.3-8.)

The

proposed plea agreements.”
he was

Counsel testiﬁed that the

district

if the state

to a felony

would have accepted

the plea.”

represented that

it

based 0n Andrus’s criminal

court found that, “[a]fter considering

district

[Andrus’s] prior convictions and the superseding felony charge, there

the trial court

the plea

until

would have,

and had amended the charge

to revoke the offer

would have accepted

Andrus could not have entered a plea

446, 374 P.3d at 609.

trial court.

district court

(R., p.174.)

is

a strong reason t0 doubt

Because Andrus has not shown

that

he would have accepted the plea offer 0r the court would have accepted the plea agreement, he
has failed t0 demonstrate prejudice.

Andrus argues
advised that

it

that if counsel

had “immediately conveyed” the offer and “strongly

be immediately accepted,” Andrus would have accepted the offer before

revoked.

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

The mere

fact that counsel

more favorable than

However, there

n0 evidence

is

would have advised Andrus

the sentence ultimately

imposed

is

directly address

Whether the

t0 take the offer 0r that the offer

The

was

insufﬁcient to establish prejudice in the

trial

court

at that time.

would have accepted Andrus’s

plea, but instead asserts that the court’s ability t0 reject a plea does not give the court the

7

was

t0 support that assertion.7

absence of evidence that Andrus would have actually accepted the offer

Andrus does not

it

power

noted that Andrus “includes a bare and conclusory statement in his Amended
would have accepted the plea offer.” (R., p.173, n3.) However, Andrus

district court

Petition that he

provided n0 evidence to support that statement. “A11 other evidence submitted

at the

evidentiary

hearing 0n the issue contradicts his conclusory statement, which the Court [found] to lack
credibility in light

0f the testimonies of [counsel] and Bailey.”
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(R., p.173, n.3.)

to

control

the

state’s

charging decisions 0r compel the

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

However, the

state

withdrew

its

state

t0

pursue felony charges.

plea offer and

moved

R., p.173.) Thus, there is

no argument

a means of compelling the state to charge the

Last,

Andrus argues

thereafter, the state

that if

would be

that the trial court

DUI as

would have

the

rej ected

the plea as

a felony; the state had already done so.

he accepted the offer and the

in breach

amend

(E EX., p.1 14;

charge t0 a felony before the April 29 expiration date and pretrial conference.

ﬂ alﬂ

t0

state

attempted t0 revoke

it

of the plea agreement and bound to honor the bargain.

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.) However, “[t]he State’s obligations under a plea agreement ripen only

‘upon the entering 0f a plea.”

App. 201

State V. Pierce, 150 Idaho 725, 728,

The cases

(quoting I.C.R. 11(f)(1)).

1)

Andrus would have been
are all distinguishable

entitled to a

0n one key

defendants entered guilty pleas.

remedy

fact:

E

that

Andrus

if the state

249 P.3d 1180, 1183

cites as support for his assertion that

withdrew the offer

Santobello V.

he accepted

it

New

York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)

ﬂ alﬂ McAmis

V.

155 Idaho 796, 797, 317 P.3d 49, 50 (Ct. App. 2013) (prosecutor breached plea agreement

by exceeding sentencing recommendation).
state

after

in those cases, the state’s breach occurred after the

(prosecutor breached plea agreement through sentencing recommendation);

m,

(Ct.

revoked

would not

it,

Even

if

Andrus had accepted the

he would not yet have entered a guilty plea and therefore the

yet have been triggered.

ﬂ m,

I.C.R. 11(f).
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150 Idaho

at

offer before the

state’s obligations

728, 249 P.3d at 1183;

ﬂ

211$

Andrus Has Failed To Show That Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Moving To
Exclude The Breath Test Results And Expert Testimony Utilizing The Widmark

3.

Eguation

The evidence

showed

at trial

pm and detained him to

transport

that ofﬁcers

him

L.6; p.165, Ls.5-8; p.179, Ls.3-4.)

made

contact with Andrus 0n the bridge at 1:54

t0 the hospital at 2:00

At

that time,

pm.

(Trial Tr., p.155, L.18

Deputy Bratt noticed

that

smell 0f alcohol, slow and slurred speech, and red and watery eyes.

p.154,

L23; p.156, L.7 — p.157,

also noticed the strong odor 0f stale alcohol. (Trial Tr., p.200,

At
p.198, L.2

the hospital,

—

Andrus told

staff that

six hours before arriving at the hospital.

Andrus

if

(Trial Tr., p.328, Ls.24-25.)

Deputy Koopmans asked

he drank a half pint of vodka and Andrus indicated yes. (Trial

Tr.,

T11,

he drank two shots 0f vodka

At around 3:25 pm, Andrus provided breath samples Which revealed

(E Trial

L.9.)

he drank half a pint 0f vodka that day. (Trial
that

—

contact With Andrus, he

L22 — p.201,

At another time, Andrus indicated

p.199, L.16.)

Andrus had a strong

(Trial Tr., p.153, L.25

When Deputy Koopmans made

L.17.)

— p.156,

Tr.,

p.213, Ls.16-19.)

BAC

his

t0

be 247/248.

p.261, Ls.16-23; p.299, Ls.16-17.)

When Andrus was

detained, he did not have any alcohol containers

0n or near

his person.

owner

(Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.10-13.) Inside the truck

Andrus borrowed and drove

Kelley Biggers found a cup about half

with clear liquid in the cup holder, a glass vodka

bottle that

full

was about one-half to two-thirds

full,

t0 the bridge, its

papers, a trophy, and miscellaneous trash. (Trial

TL, p.341, Ls.13-21; p.343, Ls.16-24; p.346, L.3 — p.347, L.18; p.350, Ls.15-19.)

Andrus testiﬁed

that

he purchased a ﬁfth 0f vodka and poured the vodka into a 16-20

ounce water bottle so that he could g0 out in public and drink
25; p.495, L.12

— p.496, L6.) At some

(Trial Tr., p.496, Ls.19-21.)

point

Andrus testiﬁed

later,

that

24

discreetly.

(Trial Tr., p.485, Ls.7-

he also poured vodka into a clear plastic cup.

he then got into the vehicle he borrowed from

Biggers and took the cup 0f vodka, the water bottle 0f vodka, the vodka bottle, scriptures, a bible,

Emmy award.

and his

Andrus testiﬁed

(Trial Tr., p.499, Ls.10-24.)

he drove to

that eventually

Perrine Bridge and parked in the Visitor pull out and exited the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.508, Ls.12-

19.)

Andrus testiﬁed
Ls.20-21.)

p.508,

immediately

that, at this point,

he had not yet consumed any 0f the vodka.

Andrus testiﬁed

Later,

after getting out

that

of the vehicle.” (Trial

he began
Tr., p.51 1,

(Trial Tr.,

consuming alcohol “[a]1most

Ls.13-16.)

Robert Rausch, an Idaho State Police (ISP) lieutenant and registered nurse, testiﬁed as an
expert for the

state.

Widmark Equation

(E Trial

person’s weight, gender, amount of alcohol

made
pm.

— p.373,

L.1.)

(Trial Tr., p.375,

alcohol.

Rausch

Tr.,

p.349, L.9

utilized the

that the

can be calculated using that

time, and time since consumption.

the time

Deputy Bratt

pm and when Andrus took the breath test at 3:25

Andrus consumed 70 proof vodka, with 35 percent

— p.350,

ﬂ

L.2;

after arriving at the bridge

would be

at

and just prior

enforcement contact, his expected

more than half a ﬁfth of vodka

the provided data and the various

trial to

around 3:25 pm: (1)

.099; (2) if

.175. (Trial Tr., p.380, L.1

211$ p.377, Ls.19-21.)

Widmark Equation With

expected under each scenario

later

Rausch explained

L.22 — p.376, L.15.) Andrus’s weight was listed on the booking sheet as

alcohol over time that had been suggested at

minutes

Lt.

Around 90 minutes passed between

(Trial Tr., p.377, Ls.1-4.)

(E Trial

BAC

consumed over

contact With Andrus 0n the bridge at 1:54

162 pounds.

p.357, L23.)

a formula from Which a person’s

is

(Trial Tr., p.372, L.21

—

p.355, L.13

Tr.,

t0

what

BAC

Andrus consumed half a pint of vodka

Andrus consumed two shots of vodka

BAC

would have been

law enforcement contact, his expected

would be

at the bridge, his

— p.381,

if

calculate

L.4.)

25

amounts 0f

zero;

and

expected

(3) if

BAC

BAC

ninety

six hours before

Andrus consumed

ninety minutes later

law

slightly

would be

Andrus extensively cross—examined

Widmark

expert Robert LaPier,

like the

(E

calculations.

Who

move

BAC,

to calculate

(E generally Trial

amended post-conviction

In his

failing to

Trial Tr., p.396, L.15

—

p.406, L6.)

limitations with

Andrus called

Thereafter,

testiﬁed about the limitations of using a single mathematical formula

Widmark Equation

speciﬁc circumstances.

Rausch about the variables and

Lt.

to exclude

given the variability 0f each person’s body and the

Tr.,

petition,

both the breath

p.419, L.2

— p.470,

Andrus asserted

test results

L.5.)

that counsel

was

ineffective for

and testimony regarding the Widmark

Equation. (R., pp.65-66, 68-69.)

At

the evidentiary hearing, counsel testiﬁed about the various things he looks for in a

case t0 challenge the validity 0f the results 0f ﬁeld sobriety tests 0r a breath

p.24, L.14

—

test.

(9/26/2019

DUI
Tr.,

Counsel testiﬁed that he researched the 15-minute waiting period and

p.28, L.15.)

found case law stating that ofﬁcers are not required to watch the defendant uninterrupted for the
entire period, so long as the defendant is in the presence

entire time.

(9/26/2019

regarding the

infeasibility

Tr., p.40, Ls.7-12.)

Widmark Equation and

and under the surveillance 0f ofﬁcers the

Counsel also testiﬁed he consulted several sources

hired a defense expert t0 testify at

(9/26/2019

Tr., 32,

consider ﬁling a motion in limine to exclude the use 0f the

had been admitted

in trials

p.35, L3.) Counsel dealt with the

be unreliable. (9/26/2019

many

is

L.14 — p.34, L.5.)

Counsel did not

Widmark Equation because he knew

times in the county.

Widmark Equation

in other cases

L.6

—

had never been held

to

(9/26/2019

and

it

Tr., p.34,

Tr., p.62, Ls.2-7.)

Deputy Bruce Case, a certiﬁed breath
period

regarding the

of using one mathematical equation t0 determine the alcohol absorption of a speciﬁc

person under varying circumstances.

the formula

trial

required to ensure that any

test specialist, testiﬁed that the

mouth alcohol

26

dissipates

and the breath

15-minute waiting

test

instrument

is

registering alcohol

test

mouth

instrument detected

(9/26/2019

that

from the lungs. (9/26/2019

T11, p.88,

alcohol,

it

Tr., p. 87, Ls.9-20; p.88, Ls.15-19.)

would not accept

blow

the

If the breath

as a valid breath sample.

L.25 — p.89, L.22.) Deputy Case testiﬁed that he would not be concerned

mouth alcohol had entered

into a subject’s system,

were .247/.248 because there

the subject, if the blows

even
is

if

ofﬁcers had taken their eyes off

only a .001 variation; with the two

minute waiting period between the blows, there would be a substantial change registered

mouth alcohol had been

introduced.

nothing about the breath
(9/26/2019

The

Tr., p.90,

district court

test results indicated the

presence of mouth alcohol in this case.

test results

move

to

because such a motion would likely have been unsuccessful. The

jail

Video of the breath

test,

Which was introduced

at trial,

shows the Petitioner under the surveillance 0f either Deputy Koopmans, Sergeant Mencl

consistent with

Thompson

for the entirety

0f the ﬁfteen—minute waiting period,” which

Deputy Koopmans testimony.8

evidentiary hearing “that he

(R., p.180.)

would have ﬁled a motion

simply not the case.”

would not have
The

(R., p.180.)

registered as valid if

district court

Further,

in limine

Andrus does not challenge the

had nobody been
(R., p.180.)

Deputy Case’s testimony

room

in the

“However,

that the breath

that is

sample

mouth alcohol was introduced “was uncontroverted.”

found that had

trial

is

Additionally, counsel testiﬁed at the

With the Petitioner during the ﬁfteen minute observation period.”

8

that

found that “multiple ofﬁcers were in the room monitoring the Petitioner during the

and/or Deputy

p.180.)

Deputy Case testiﬁed

concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing to

observation period.” (R., p.180.) The
“clearly

1.)

Ls.12-15.)

district court

exclude the breath

(9/26/2019 TL, p.90, Ls.3-1

if

(R.,

counsel ﬁled a motion in limine t0 exclude the

district court’s factual

his appeal.
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ﬁnding, nor does he address the Video in

breath test results 0n this basis,

show

that counsel

was

it

would have been unsuccessful;
move.

ineffective for failing to so

Similarly, the district court found that “there is

exclude the state’s use 0f the

Widmark

1

n0 reason

(E R.,

p.

1

to believe” that a

own versions of events

expert “used the

accurate.”

(R.,

calculation

Widmark

(R., p.184.)

It

t0

was

0f,

and

to rebut, the

regarding his alcohol consumption.” (R., p.182.) The state’s

equation t0 opine that the Petitioner’s version 0f events could not be

As

p.183.)

motion

84.) “[T]he record establishes the

equation was used by the State t0 challenge the credibility

Petitioner’s

failed t0

80-8 1 .)

equation would have been granted.

undisputed that Rausch was qualiﬁed as an expert.

Widmark

(R., pp.

Andrus

therefore,

the district court detailed, the information used in Rausch’s

was provided by Andrus himself—his weight, gender, type and quantity of

alcohol,

time and period of alcohol consumption, food consumption, and drinking history. (R., pp.183-84
(citing Trial Tr., pp.377, 486-87, 513-14,

speculative 0r unsubstantiated but

526, 549-50).)

was based 0n admissible

the credibility of Andrus’s version of events,

the state;

was admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702; and

Andrus

use of the

A

facts in the record;

which was the purpose

exclude the testimony would have been denied.

that

Thus, Rausch’s opinion was not

failed t0

show

that counsel

was

(R., p.184.)

for

which

therefore, a

Thus, the

ineffective for failing to

it

was

relevant t0

was offered by

motion

in limine t0

district court

move

concluded

to exclude the state’s

Widmark Equation.
claim that counsel should have

prongs of the Strickland

m, 127 Idaho

test if the

made

a particular motion

does not require that an attorney object t0 admissible evidence.

trial

properly rejected on both

motion would have been denied by the

709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995).

admissible and the

is

trial court.

Sanchez

V.

“Effective legal representation

Indeed, if evidence

is

arguably

court could have properly allowed the evidence even if counsel had

28

objected,

m,

trial

counsel’s performance generally Will not be objectively deficient.”

161 Idaho 485, 494, 387 P.3d 153, 162 (Ct. App. 2016).

made, should have been granted, “the petitioner

is still

the decision not t0 ﬁle the motion ‘was Within the

strategy.”’

Wurdemann

V.

Even

if the

Adams

motion, had

it

V.

been

required to overcome the presumption that

Wide range 0f permissible discretion and

trial

161 Idaho 713, 718, 390 P.3d 439, 444 (2017) (emphasis

State,

The

omitted) (quoting Estrada V. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006)).
court properly concluded that counsel

was not

ineffective for failing to

the breath results or testimony regarding the

move

Widmark Equation because

district

to exclude either

the evidence

was

admissible.

First, the

breath test results were admissible and a motion to exclude the evidence would

have been denied because the ﬁfteen-minute waiting period was properly observed.
charged With promulgating rules for administering breath alcohol

So long

as the test complies With the procedures delineated

tests.

by ISP,

E

LC.

ISP

is

§ 18-8004(4).

the results are admissible in

court without the need for testimony regarding the reliability of the testing procedure. Li. ISP’S

standard operating procedures manual instructs ofﬁcers to clear the defendant’s

monitor the defendant for ﬁfteen minutes prior to conducting a breath

DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 337, 144 P.3d 40, 42
waiting period, the defendant

Beﬂ,

may

(Ct.

not smoke, drink,

App. 2006).
eat, belch,

155 Idaho 134, 140, 306 P.3d 219, 225 (Ct. App. 2013).

ﬁfteen-minute period must

restart.

test.

During

E

that ﬁfteen—minute

burp, or vomit

If

m
m

mouth and

Li;

any such event occurs, the

Li

“The ﬁfteen-minute monitoring period

is

not an onerous burden and

‘[t]his

foundational

standard ordinarily Will be met if the ofﬁcer stays in close physical proximity t0 the test subject
so that the ofﬁcer’s senses 0f sight, smell and hearing can be

29

employed.”

Bennett

V. State

Dep’t of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 144, 206 P.3d 505, 508
143 Idaho

at

(Ct.

App. 2009) (quoting DeFranco,

338, 144 P.3d at 43). “‘[O]bservation’ can include not only Visual observation but

use of other senses as well. So long as the ofﬁcer

is

continually in position t0 use his senses, not

vomit during the observation

just sight, to determine that the defendant did not belch, burp 0r

period, the observation complies with the training

ofﬁcer need not

As

‘stare

ﬁxedly’

manual

at the subj ect for the entire

instructions.”

Li Simply

put, “the

observation period.” Li.

the district court found, the evidence demonstrates that

Andrus was observed by

multiple ofﬁcers throughout the entire ﬁfteen minute period, in compliance with ISP procedures.

Sergeant Mencl and Deputy

Thomas were

during the ﬁfteen-minute waiting period.
testiﬁed that he did not hear

Ls.5-8; p.276, Ls.4-6.)

in the

room with Andrus and Deputy Koopmans

(E Trial

Tr.,

Andrus burp, belch, 0r vomit during

Further, the district court found,

appeal, that Video depicting the waiting period,

Deputy Koopmans

p.228, Ls.15-18.)

that time.

and the ﬁnding

Which was introduced

is

(Trial Tr., p.226,

unchallenged on

at trial, “clearly

shows

[Andrus] under the surveillance 0f either Deputy Koopmans, Sergeant Mencl and/or Deputy

Thompson

[sic] for

the entirety of the ﬁfteen-minute waiting period.” (R., p.180.) Additionally,

certiﬁed breath specialist Deputy Case testiﬁed that nothing indicated

introduced during the waiting period.

(E 9/26/2019

Tr., p.88,

mouth alcohol had been

L.25 — p.90, L.15.) Because the

evidence shows that Andrus was observed by several ofﬁcers throughout the ﬁfteen—minute
waiting period, a motion to exclude the breath test results 0n that basis would have been denied

by the

trial court.

Andrus
that counsel

relies

was

0n the person

Therefore, counsel

was not

ineffective for failing t0 ﬁle such a motion.

on one sentence of Deputy Koopmans’s

ineffective for not

for 15 minutes.”

moving

trial

testimony t0 support his claim

t0 exclude the breath test results: “I did not

have eyes

(Appellant’s brief, p.15 (quoting Trial Tr., p.264, Ls.10-12.)
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Andrus then

asserts that “[h]ad counsel investigated this issue prior to trial

by doing research

client and/or

exclude the results of the breath

his

he would likely have been able to

into the relevant case law,

test.”

by speaking with

(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.) However, the record

clear that counsel speciﬁcally considered Whether the ﬁfteen-minute period

makes

had been properly

observed and neither the facts nor the case law supported such a motion.
discussed above, the evidence supports the district court’s unchallenged factual

First,

ﬁnding

that

Andrus was observed by multiple ofﬁcers

waiting period.

The ofﬁcers were able

for the duration of the ﬁfteen

to use their senses, including sight, sound,

is

and smell,

to

That Deputy Koopmans “did

observe Andrus and ensure that he did not burp, belch, or vomit.
not have eyes 0n” Andrus for the entire ﬁfteen minute period

minute

therefore irrelevant, given that

case law clearly establishes “the ofﬁcer need not ‘stare ﬁxedly’ at the subject for the entire

observation period.”

E m,

147 Idaho

at 144,

206 P.3d

at 50.

Second, the record also demonstrates that counsel took steps to investigate whether the

DUI procedures were

followed in this case. Counsel testiﬁed that in this case, as with

generally, one 0f the ﬁrst issues he looks into is Whether the testing

administered.

(m 9/26/2019 TL, p.24, L.12 — p.25, L.16.)

0f things he looks for in every

DUI case—operation

DUI cases

was properly and

validly

Counsel provided speciﬁc examples

logs, certiﬁcations, reading

of

rights, test

ﬂuid, and if standard ﬁeld sobriety tests could have been interfered with by physical disability,
strobing lights, temperature, timeframes, or height differences between the ofﬁcer and defendant,

among

other things.

(E 9/26/2019

Tr., p.25, Ls.9-16; p.27, Ls.3-20; p.28, Ls.1-7.)

Counsel

testiﬁed that he also checks that the ﬁfteen minute waiting period has been properly observed and

there

was n0

interference, such as a

observed the Video recording in

cough or sneeze. (9/26/2019

this case

and did not see any
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issues.

Tr., p.18, Ls.3-15.)

(9/26/2019

Counsel

Tr., p.26,

Ls.18-

22; p.29, L.4; p.59, Ls.4-10.)

0n which Andrus

relies,

Supreme Court has held
as they are under

some

Further,

When

presented With Deputy Koopmans’s

counsel responded: “Well,
that they don’t

sort

have

t0

I

did

some research 0n

testimony

the issue, and the

have solid eyes 0n them for 15 minutes, as long

0f surveillance, that there are people around them and so

they don’t have to have actual eyes on them for that waiting period.” (9/26/2019

12.)

trial

forth,

but

Tr., p.40, Ls.7-

Thus, the record shows that counsel investigated both the evidence in Andrus’s case and the

relevant case law regarding the ﬁfteen-minute waiting period.

Andrus has

failed to

show

that

counsel was ineffective for failing to ﬁle a motion to exclude breath test results obtained in

compliance with ISP testing procedures.

The

district court also

properly concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing to

ﬁle a motion t0 exclude the use of the

“assist[s] the trier

m,

of

fact t0

Widmark

Equation.

Expert testimony

This Court has recognized that the

Widmark

Equation,

extrapolation, “is a generally accepted scientiﬁc method,

166 Idaho 334,

m

admissible if

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”

145 Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted);

M,

is

when

ﬂ alﬁ

it

I.R.E. 702.

even when used for retrograde
applied correctly.”9

E

Marsalis

_, 458 P.3d 203, 212 (2020) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions)

(emphasis omitted).

Rausch’s testimony was admissible and a motion t0 exclude his testimony would have

9

In Marsalis, this Court held that there

court

would have granted a motion

was a genuine question of fact regarding Whether
to exclude the expert’s testimony using the

the trial

Widmark

Equation for retrograde extrapolation based only 0n the fact that n0 blood 0r breath alcohol
testing was ever done 0n the individuals to determine their BAC at any relevant time. Marsalis,
166 Idaho at
458 P.3d at 213-14.

_,
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been properly denied, because the testimony assisted the

was based 0n

Andrus told several

facts in the record.

staff t0 explain his alcohol

consumption on

that day.

jury,

was

stories t0

relevant t0 facts in issue, and

law enforcement and medical

(Trial Tr., p.198, L.2

—

p.199, L.16; p.328,

Ls.24-25.) Rausch used the information that Andrus provided in those stories as data points for

the

Widmark

Rausch opined

Equation.

that

(E

Andrus’s

of events than the .247/.248
enforcement.

— p.381,

Trial Tr., p.375, L.22

Using

L.4.)

that information,

BAC would have been signiﬁcantly lower under any of his versions

BAC

he registered ninety minutes

(Trial Tr., p.380, L.1

—

p.381, L.4.)

after his initial contact

with law

Because Rausch’s opinion was based on

information provided by Andrus himself and because

it

was

relevant t0 assist the jury in

understanding the science 0f alcohol absorption and determining Whether Andrus’s versions 0f
events could be true, the testimony utilizing the

t0 exclude the testimony

Widmark Equation

move

—

p.35, L.3; p.62, Ls.2-7.)

commonly admitted

t0 exclude the testimony

in prior cases

counsel testiﬁed that t0 his knowledge
p.34, L.6

admissible and a motion

would have been unsuccessﬁll.

Further, counsel’s decision to not

encountered the

Widmark Equation was

it

and knew

it

had never been held

was

was used generally
t0

be unreliable.

in the county;

(9/26/2019

Rather than attempt t0 exclude What he

testimony, counsel instead challenged the expert’s testimony at

both cross—examination and a defense expert

Who

Counsel

strategic.

knew
trial

testiﬁed about the limitations of the

(E generally Trial

Tr.,

p.396, L.15

-

p.406, L.6; p.419, L.2

-

be

through

Widmark

Equation and the inherent imprecision 0f applying a single mathematical formula t0
beings.

t0

Tr.,

human

p.470, L.5.) Thus, Andrus

has failed to show that counsel was ineffective for not moving t0 exclude the state’s use of the

Widmark Equation.
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Andrus argues

0f the Widmark Equation was unreliable because the

that “application

expert lacked the necessary facts and the

BAC

minutes after the time of consumption.”
found, the state did not use Andrus’s

used as a

(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

BAC

and

p.182.)

show

to rebut, the Petitioner’s

Andrus acknowledges

that “if

Widmark Equation

own versions of events
as

much, describing

that the state

Mr. Andrus had consumed alcohol only

measured .247 and .248.” (Appellant’s

found, the Rausch’s opinion

p.184.)

The

“facts” that

was not

“unreliable facts”

Andrus himself provided

to

court

BAC

at the

used the Widmark Equation

test,

brief, p.16.)

the

by

Mata

state

would have been

Second, as the

law enforcement and medical

this case t0

BAC

which the

to

district court

facts in the record.

(R.,

Rausch’s opinion was based were the

using these “facts” as data points was to prove that they were, in

Andrus next compares

First, as the district

after reaching the bridge,

asserts

could not be true and have yielded Andrus’s .247/.248

90

“to challenge the credibility

speculative or unsubstantiated

on Which Andrus

at least

regarding his alcohol consumption.” (R.,

estimated t0 be approximately ninety minutes prior to the breath
.175, not the

was acquired

as a starting point to calculate Andrus’s

time he was driving; instead, the state used the

0f,

starting point

fact,

staff;

the state’s point in

“unreliable” because they

BAC.

V. State,

46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

(Appellant’s brief, p.18.) That case dealt with reverse extrapolation, where the expert opined as

t0 the defendant’s

BAC

at the

time he was driving based 0n breath

hours after the defendant was stopped.

m, 46 S.W.3d

unfamiliar with the defendant’s weight, drinking habits,

drink before the breath

m

test,

or

When

at

test results

taken over two

904-07. The expert in that case was

how much

the defendant

the defendant last drank before the

test.

had

to eat or

Li. at 905.

The

court determined that “the science 0f retrograde extrapolation can be reliable in a given

case,” but

was not

reliable in that case

due

t0 the expert’s inconsistent testimony
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and lack of

knowledge regarding the defendant’s personal
calculation.

Li. at 916-17.

mirror” the facts 0f

in

m, Rausch

m.

relied

characteristics that

in the

Contrary to Andrus’s assertion, the facts 0f this case do not “closely

Unlike in

m,

the state did not use retrograde extrapolation. Unlike

0n Andrus’s speciﬁc self—reported personal

in his calculation. Thus,

were used as variables

characteristics as the variables

Mata does not support Andrus’s argument.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.

DATED this 24th day of November, 2020.
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